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Obstacles or motors of Europeanization?
German media and the transnationalization
of public debate
RUUD KOOPMANS and BARBARA PFETSCH
Abstract
This article aims to contribute to the discussion on the Europeanization of
public spheres. It is the starting point for an investigation into the role of
the media in transnational debate in Germany. The study aims to determine
whether the media function as either a motor of or an obstacle to Europe-
anization of national public debate, compared to other actors. Drawing on
empirical data from the project “The transformation of political mobilisa-
tion and communication in European public spheres”1 (Europub.com), we
analyze the communications through which political actors, civil society
actors, and the media in Germany make public demands on European is-
sues. Sources on which this investigation was built were the news and edito-
rial section of two national quality newspapers (center-left, center-right),
one tabloid and one regional newspaper in the period between 2000 and
2002. The findings show that the demands made by the media are generally
more European in scope than those made by other political actors. Regard-
ing the evaluation of EU integration and the frames that are advocated,
the German press and the political elite are rather convergent.
Keywords: public sphere, Europe, public debate, newspaper, Germany
Introduction
In the discussion on the democratic deficit of the European Union, it is
widely acknowledged that to overcome a lack of legitimacy and popular
involvement in top-down political and economic integration, a Europe-
anization of public communication is needed. This function of public
communication in the European democratization process has triggered
a vivid debate on the nature of a European public sphere and the condi-
tions of its emergence (Neidhardt, Koopmans, and Pfetsch, 2000). Schol-
ars agree that the mass media are the prime forum for the public repre-
sentation of a European public sphere. The emergence of a politically
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relevant European media system, however, seems unrealistic. Most stud-
ies, for various reasons  such as language, cultural heterogenety, and
the national make up of media systems  refer to European sphere in
terms of a Europeanization of national public spheres. The ambitions of
projects that do aim to identify a potentially emerging European public
sphere focus on the mass media and try to establish the prominence of
European issues and actors in media coverage over time (Gerhards,
2000; Eilders and Voltmer, 2004), or across countries (Peter and de
Vreese, 2003; Kevin, 2003; Eder and Trenz, 2000).
The empirical studies on the visibility of European issues and actors
maintain that the Europeanization of the public sphere is rather low
(Gerhards, 2000). Interestingly enough, studies of media coverage 
explicitly or implicitly  share the assumption that the Europeanization
of national public spheres is in the interest of the majority of political
and economic elites in EU member states. The media are considered an
obstacle to Europeanized political communication. It is argued that the
logic of the media and in particular the rationales of newsmaking  for
instance, the professional news values as selection criteria of messages,
the goal of attracting large national audiences by personalized, conflic-
tual, and event-driven coverage and their disinterest in administrative,
policy driven information  result in a lack of interest in European
issues and actors, and eventually keep public political debate within the
boundaries of the nation state (Gerhards, 1992, 1993). Thus, the media
are held responsible for the resilience of largely nationally focused pub-
lic spheres.
In this study, we aim to determine whether the media are rightly or
wrongly accused of being an obstacle to the Europeanization of national
public spheres. Our empirical basis is an analysis of the structure of
public claims made on several issues in Germany between 2000 and 2002.
This analysis allows us to compare claims made by the media themselves
to those made by other collective actors, both state and party elites, and
actors from within civil society. The article is divided in three sections.
In the first section, the role of the media in the debate on the European-
ization of public spheres is briefly discussed and a review of the findings
of current research is given. A critical discussion of these studies intro-
duces the approach used in the present study. We maintain that Europe-
anization should be studied with reference to the structures and scopes
of public debate in specific policy areas. The empirical analysis draws on
data from the project “The transformation of political mobilisation and
communication in European public spheres” (Europub. com). Com-
munication is analyzed through which political actors and media actors
make public demands on selected issues. Claims made by collective ac-
tors are compared that appeared in the news sections of a sample of
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German newspapers. They are compared to claims made by these media
themselves in the news sections as well as in the editorials. The newspa-
per sample includes two quality newspapers with national reach (center-
left, center-right), one tabloid, and one regional newspaper.
The media’s role in Europeanization of the public sphere
Since the early 1990s, a significant strand of research has evolved that
emphasizes the centrality of media in a potentially emerging European
public sphere (Gerhards, 1993, 2000; Schlesinger, 1997; Schlesinger and
Kevin, 2000; Kunelius and Sparks, 2001; Kevin, 2003; Trenz, 2002;
Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). With respect to the possible development
of a mass-mediated European public sphere, scholars have come to agree
that the realization of a genuinely transnational mass media system
maintaining the political functions of a democratic European public
sphere, is rather unlikely2. Linguistic boundaries, cultural heterogeneity,
and the fact that media systems are strongly focused on national mass
audiences are crucial and perhaps insurmountable barriers to the forma-
tion of a unified European public sphere, which would be a replication
at the European level of the structure we know from national media
systems. Several scholars (e. g., Gerhards, 1993, 2000; Schlesinger and
Kevin, 2000) have, therefore, come to argue that the potentially emerg-
ing European public sphere should be sought within the national public
spheres of the various European countries. This perspective maintains
that Europeanization “is for the most part dependent on the output of
the national media” (Kevin, 2003: 52).
Empirical studies that investigate Europeanization in terms of the vis-
ibility of European issues3 in national media present rather sobering
findings. Gerhards (2000: 294295) and Eilders and Voltmer (2003:16)
find that European issues comprise between six and seven percent, on
average, of all issues in German quality press between the 1960s and the
1990s. This percentage remains largely stable over time and only in-
creases marginally in the early 1990s. The low visibility of European
issues also seems to hold for other types of media and other countries.
Except for the periods of European summit meetings, a rather low cover-
age of EU related stories can be observed in television news in France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Only in Denmark
the EU was more prominent in television news (Peter and de Vreese,
2003)4.
For this lack of visibility of European issues and actors in the media
a number of reasons can be identified that stress the contradictory incen-
tives underlying the political logic of the EU and the logic of national
media organisations (Gerhards, 1992, 1993). It is argued that the Euro-
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pean decision-making process would not produce enough newsworthy
messages and events on a regular basis, which comply with news values
of the media. It is also emphasized that European actors are not depend-
ent on public legitimization or support of the European citizenry, and,
therefore, do not have any incentive to go public on a European level.
This mechanism reduces the opportunities for the media to personalize
European politics. Hence, the general argument is that European politics
do not cater to the attention rules of the media, which undermines its
public visibility5. In combination, the logics of both EU politics and
media organizations seem to constitute mutually reinforcing factors that
fuel a vicious circle, that continuously reproduces the visibility deficit of
Europe in the media.6
In this line of reasoning it seems that the media are implicitly put on
the spot for hindering the Europeanization of public communication.
We argue that this position should be revisited, because no empirical
evidence for the Euro-scepticism of the media can be identified if com-
pared to other political actors. Our argument refers to the media as
political actors in their own right (Page, 1996), in addition to their role
as mediators of information from external sources. Thus, we see the
media in public communication in a dual role of conveyors of external
information and active participants in political discourse. On the one
hand, they convey a constructed reality of messages created by external
sources that is processed according to their selection rules and media
formats. On the other hand, the media stand out as actors in their own
right. In this role, they are acknowledged as actors in the public sphere
that legitimately contribute to the political discourse by adding their own
voice in specific formats such as commentary and editorials.
Reflecting on the dimensions in which the dual role of the media plays
out in Europeanized public debate, Eilders and Voltmer (2004) discuss
(1) agenda-setting and ‘second level agenda-setting’ (or framing); and (2)
opinion formation which refers to presenting positions on issues and
actors’ evaluations. In their function as agenda-setters, the media select
issues from external sources and present them as topics for public de-
liberation (Dearing and Rogers, 1996; Protess and McCombs, 1991).
Within the recognized formats or commentary sections, they may not
follow the rank order of issues by non-media actors and introduce their
own saliencies on the issue agenda. The same duality applies to the so-
called ‘second-level agenda-setting’ function (Ghanem, 1997; McCombs
et al., 2000) or framing (Gamson, 1992), which refers to the contextuali-
zation of issues, namely the construction of a framework of interpreta-
tive meaning and opinion around an issue. Again, publicly visible frames
can be rooted either in the communicative actions of external actors or
stem from the interpretations of the media themselves. One can expect
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that these do not necessarily coincide. The media’s own agenda may well
emphasize European issues and frames while, at the same time, some
political actors adhere to a predominantly national perspective.
The most genuine and specific media function refers to their active role
in opinion formation. This function is institutionalized in commentaries,
where the media enact their role as opinion makers. Eilders and Voltmer
(2004) point out that the media in most national public spheres take
stances according to a more or less stable commentary line. The com-
mentary line contributes to the identification of a media outlet, and situ-
ates it within the spectrum of political cleavages. In many countries,
however, European politics are not strongly linked to the traditional left-
right spectrum, so that the national cleavages cannot be transferred to
European politics. In this case, the media have more room to maneuver
politically in as far as their opinion on European issues is concerned. In
such circumstances, the media may choose to follow the opinion of the
political elite, but they may also side with other interests such as civil
society organizations, or speak in line with general public opinion. An-
other function that comes with the notion of media as political actors
and which is institutionalized in the media format of commentaries, re-
fers to their legitimate potential to evaluate and criticize other actors.
Thus, the media may be favorable towards European integration and yet
yield critical opinions on the performance of European or national ac-
tors.
Conceptual framework for the study of media and political actors
in public debate
In our empirical study, we aim to compare the voice of the media with
the voice of political actors and civil society actors with regard to the
Europeanization of public debate in seven policy fields. Following our
notion of Europeanization, we propose that the spatial reach and bound-
aries of public communication can be determined by investigating pat-
terns of communicative flows and assessing the relative density of public
communication within and between different political spaces (Koopmans
and Erbe, 2004). The center of this communicative space is the German
public sphere. The next level of communication refers to other national
European public spaces, which comprise the European member states.
The third level comprises the transnational, European political space, in
which the European institutions and common policies are situated. The
degree to which public spheres can be considered ‘national’, ‘transna-
tional’, or ‘European’ depends on the density of communicative linkages
within and between these spaces. The media  as well as other actors 
may engage in two basic forms of geo-political and spatial contextualiza-
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tion of their public communication: The pattern of vertical Europeaniza-
tion consists of communicative linkages between the national and the
European level. The pattern of horizontal Europeanization consists of
communicative linkages between different EU-member states.
In order to assess the role of the media compared to other actors, we
consider individual public claims by different collective actors7. Our
units of analysis are individual acts of expression of public political opin-
ion, which we label as claims. We define an instance of claim-making as
a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purpos-
ive and public articulation of political demands. An act of claim-making
usually consists of the following elements: (a) a subject actor, or claim-
ant, who makes a demand, proposal, appeal, or criticism; (b) an ad-
dressee, who is held responsible for implementing the claim, or is the
target of criticism or support; (c) an object actor, whose interests are or
would be positively (beneficiary) or negatively affected by the claim; the
substantive content of the claim, stating (d) what is to be done (aim) and
(e) why (frame). Claims are included regardless of their form (statement,
decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature
of the actor (media, governments, civil society actors etc.). Statements
by the media are recorded if a journalist makes a claim in an explicit
way in the news coverage or, as is more frequently the case, in commen-
taries and opinion pieces.
By taking instances of claim-making as the units of analysis, we are
in a position to identify who speaks publicly to whom, in whose interest,
and with reference to which issues and argumentative frames. Thus, we
are able to measure in detail the interactive and argumentative structure
of public communication and the linkages between the actors. Our data
allow us to analyze the claim-making of detailed actor categories (e. g.,
German farmers or the European Parliament), but for the purpose of
the following analysis the focus lies on three broad actor categories.
Besides the media, we look at state and party actors, who can be re-
garded as the actors at the centre of the political system, and interest
groups and civil society actors, who try to influence the system from
the periphery.
Another significant feature of our study design is that we do not seek
for a Europeanization of public communication on a very general level,
gathering data across all possible political issues. Instead, we do not
consider Europeanization to penetrate the national public spheres in all
themes of public debate or all policy fields. Considering the large differ-
ences in the actual competencies of European institutions among dif-
ferent policy fields, it is relatively meaningless to compute a summary
measure of the degree to which European institutions and policies are
mentioned across all political issues. Instead, we take a political opportu-
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nity structure perspective (see Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Gi-
ugni, 1995; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy, 2005), which leads
us to expect patterns of claim-making that reflect the actual distribution
of power between the European and the national level, as well as the
distinction between the European decision-making process at a primarily
intergovernmental level and decision-making at a primarily suprana-
tional level. In order to test this assumption, the study design includes
seven issue fields. In addition to the meta-field of European integration,
six substantive policy domains were selected systematically according to
their level of formal Europeanization, reaching from fully integrated to
merely coordinated domains: (1) monetary politics and (2) agriculture
represent issue areas that are characterized by a high degree of EU in-
volvement in national politics, which to an important extent entails
supranational powers for EU institutions, (3) immigration and (4) mili-
tarytroopdeployment mark the policy areas in which we observe increas-
ing EU competencies (or at least attempt to increase the EU’s role), but
where national decision making is still predominant and the EU political
process is dominated by intergovernmental negotiations. Finally, (5) re-
tirement and pensions, and (6) education are domains that have largely
remained under the umbrella of national or regional decision-making,
with a limited role for the EU.
Data and methodology
For the analysis of political claims made by media and political and civil
society actors, we draw on the news coverage and editorials of four daily
newspapers of different types that were selected to represent the national
German print media landscape: A center-left (the Süddeutsche Zeitung)
as well as a center-right quality newspaper (the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung), a tabloid paper (the Bild-Zeitung), as well as a regional news-
paper in a region with a specific regional identity (the East German
Leipziger Volkszeitung). The data refer to the years 2000 to 2002.
To limit the coding of claims to manageable proportions, a sampling
strategy was used regarding the newspaper sources. Because of the larger
amount of potentially relevant articles, a more limited sample of news
coverage was taken than merely of editorials. Regarding news coverage,
we coded one issue per week of each of the two quality newspapers. For
the year 2000, we also coded one issue every two weeks for the tabloid
and regional newspapers. However, we did not use these data in the
analysis as they would lead to an artificial overrepresentation of the year
2000, given the fact that our samples for 2001 and 2002 exclude these
two newspapers. However, we did use the 2000 coverage data on the
regional and tabloid papers to see if large qualitative differences existed
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in the types of issues and actors that were reported as compared to the
coverage of the two quality papers. These differences turned out to be
very small, suggesting that the distribution of coverage across issues and
actors does not depend much on the newspaper chosen  this to some
extent contradicts the differential attention given to certain actors and
issues in these newspapers’ editorials (see the results below)8. To further
limit the amount of work, in half of the newspaper issues that were
included in the news coverage sample for the years 2000 and 2002, we
merely coded claims with a European dimension. This reduced sample
of only Europeanized claims also applied to the news coverage sample
for the whole year 2001. For the first part of our analysis (Tables 13),
where we investigate degrees of Europeanization, we do not include the
data for the year 2001, as well as those drawn from the 2000 and 2002
issues that were coded according to the reduced sample, since including
them would have resulted in artificially inflated levels of Europeanized
claims. However, in the second part of our analysis (Tables 45), where
we look in detail at the positions taken, and the frames used in debates
on European integration and European institutions, we can use our full
data set as we focus on claims that have some kind of European dimen-
sion. In order to obtain sufficient cases to analyze the own voice of the
media, a larger sample of editorials was taken. In this case, all four
newspapers were coded for every second day of the year for the whole
period 2000 to 2002. The editorial data were coded for all sampled issues
regardless of whether the content of the editorial referred to European
dimensions or not. Nonetheless, for reasons of comparability with the
news coverage, the editorial data for the year 2001 in Tables 13 was
excluded. Altogether, the analysis draws on the news coverage articles
from 312 newspaper issues (104 full sample issues and 208 with a reduced
sample of only claims with a European dimension), and the editorials
from 1,872 issues (1,248 issues excluding the year 2001).
The coding scheme of claims records the actor or claimant, the actors
or institutions at which demands, criticism, or support is addressed, the
object actors in whose interests (according to the claimant) the claim is
made, and the content of the demand and the argumentative framing
that supports it9. More importantly, to determine whether or not Euro-
peanized claims are concerned, we coded the geographical or polity level
at which the different actors and institutions that are mentioned in the
claim (claimants, addressees, object actors) are situated (e. g., European
or national), as well as, in the case of national or subnational actors, the
country where they are based (e. g., Germany, France)10.
The salience of European (dimensions of) issues
Table 1 shows the issue agendas in the claims made by the four German
newspapers, compared to the claims by state and party actors, on the
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one hand, and civil society actors, on the other. To correctly assess the
role of the German media they are only compared to other German
actors; any claims made by non-German actors are ignored.
Table 1. Issue agenda in claim-making of German news media and political actors, 2000
and 2002 (percent).
SZ FAZ LVZ Bild Total German German All All
German state and civil German German
media party society non- actors
actors15 actors actors media
actors
Monetary 23.7 20.7 16.9 39.4 22.2 6.5 31.2 13.2 17.2
politics
Agriculture 5.9 4.9 11.3 9.1 6.0 9.4 6.1 8.7 7.5
Immigration 8.7 7.9 9.9 18.2 10.4 18.3 13.9 17.0 14.1
Troop 19.0 6.8 8.5 3.0 11.8 10.0 1.3 7.9 9.6
deployment
Pensions/ 9.9 10.5 15.5 18.2 11.8 22.4 20.3 21.7 17.3
retirement
Education 4.3 15.0 9.9 0.0 9.2 17.3 20.3 18.1 14.1
EU 28.5 34.2 28.2 12.1 28.5 16.0 6.9 13.5 20.2
integration
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 253 266 71 33 684 617 231 853 1,537
Compared to non-media political actors, the German media pay con-
siderably more attention to the issue of European integration. The two
issue areas, however, that are most clearly institutionalized at a national
level  education and pensions  are strongly underrepresented in the
media claims. Attention for European integration is particularly low
among German civil society actors. These actors are distinguished
through a strong focus on monetary politics11. Between the four newspa-
pers, some differences of emphasis exist regarding the attention that is
given in their own claims to the six substantive issue fields. The Bild
Zeitung makes a relatively large number of claims on monetary poli-
tics  particularly related to the introduction of the Euro  and on
immigration. The regional Leipziger Volkszeitung’s only distinguishing
characteristic is the highest percentage of claims on agriculture, while
the left-liberal SZ has a particularly strong focus on troop deployment,
primarily related to the build-up to the US military intervention in Iraq.
Notwithstanding these differences, the remarkable finding in this table
is  in sharp contrast to what much of the literature on European public
spheres would have us belief  that the German media (with the excep-
tion of the Bild Zeitung) have a rather strong interest in the issue of
European integration when compared to non-media actors.
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Of course, Europeanized political communication should not neces-
sarily change into debates on the meta-issue of European integration
itself, but may occur emphasizing European dimensions when discussing
the other six, more substantive policy issues. According to the predomi-
nant view on the role of the media in Europeanized political communica-
tion, the media are particularly prone to frame issues in a purely national
perspective. Table 2 tests the validity of this argument for the vertical
form of Europeanization, which consists of references to EU-level polic-
ies, actors, institutions, norms, and values.
Table 2. Percentage of claims by German actors with a vertical European frame of ref-
erence, by actor and issue field, 2000 and 2002 (percent)15.
SZ FAZ LVZ Bild Total German German All All
German state and civil German German
media party society non- actors
actors actors actors media
actors
Monetary 91.7 92.7 91.7 100.0 93.4 82.5 93.1 89.4 91.7
politics
Agriculture 80.0 76.9 75.0 (100.0) 75.6 36.2 50.3 40.5 53.0
Immigration 4.6 9.5 6.0 0.0 7.0 9.7 0.0 7.6 7.4
Troop 10.4 27.8 50.0 (0.0) 17.3 6.5 (0.0) 6.0 12.1
deployment
Pensions/ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 4.3 2.2 1.5
retirement
Education 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.9 2.1 1.3 0.9
Total 40.3 38.9 39.2 55.2 39.3 13.4 32.4 19.3 27.0
N 181 175 51 29 489 518 215 738 1,227
Note. Percentages based on less than five cases are in brackets.
The first thing to note about the results in this table is that the share
of claims with vertical European references across all claimants strongly
reflects the scope of EU competencies in each of these fields. Claims on
monetary politics almost always refer to the European level (92 %), and
the same is the case for a small majority (53 %) of agricultural claims.
Much lower levels of Europeanized claims can be found for troop de-
ployment (12 %) and immigration (7 %). The two issues in which the EU
has merely a modest coordinating role  pensions (2 %) and education
(1 %)  display the lowest levels of Europeanization in claim-making.
This result complies with the political-opportunity-structure-explanation
of patterns in the making of claims.
With regard to our comparison of media and other actors, the conclu-
sion can be drawn that the press is somewhat more likely to frame issues
with reference to the European level than other actors are. However, if
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differences between the issue fields are considered, it appears that this
tendency is not present in all issue fields and does not apply equally to
all of the newspapers. The largest difference between media and non-
media claims is found in the field of troop deployment, where media
claims (17 %) are almost three times more likely than the claims by non-
media actors (6 %) to refer to European issue-dimensions. The exception
is again the Bild Zeitung, but the low number of troop-deployment-
claims made by this paper (n  3) makes it difficult to draw any reliable
conclusion. Also with respect to agricultural issues, it can be concluded
that media claims (76 %) refer more often to European dimensions than
non-media claims (41 %) do. As for immigration and monetary politics,
the differences between media and non-media claimants are not striking.
Pensions and education issues, finally, are the only themes for which
European references are somewhat more frequent among non-media
claims, but the percentages of claims in these fields that make such refer-
ences are negligible for both categories of actors. The evidence does not
unequivocally show that the media are more inclined to emphasize verti-
cal European dimensions of issues; however, the results certainly do not
suggest the received position that the media would be inclined to de-
emphasize the European dimension and to treat issues preferably in na-
tional terms.
Table 3. Percentage of claims by German actors with a horizontal European frame of
reference, by actor and issue field, 2000 and 2002 (percent)15.
SZ FAZ LVZ Bild Total German German All All
German state and civil German German
media party society non- actors
actors actors actors media
actors
Monetary 20.0 23.6 25.0 0.0 20.4 17.5 4.2 8.9 15.5
politics
Agriculture 33.3 15.4 0.0 (33.3) 19.5 19.0 21.4 21.6 20.9
Immigration 13.6 14.3 14.3 0.0 9.9 4.4 3.1 4.1 6.6
Troop 16.7 16.7 16.7 (0.0) 16.1 11.3 (33.3) 11.9 14.2
deployment
Pensions/ 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.1
retirement
Education 18.2 5.0 0.0  6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
EU 59.7 56.0 60.0 (50.0) 58.5 46.5 31.3 44.4 53.2
integration
Total 28.9 28.2 23.9 11.9 26.2 12.5 5.6 10.8 17.6
N 253 266 71 33 684 617 231 853 1,763
Note. Percentages based on less than five cases are in brackets.
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Table 3 gives an overview of the scope of horizontal Europeanization
in cases where references are made by German actors to other EU mem-
ber or candidate member states. Considering the differences between the
seven issue fields for all actors, the results resemble those for vertical
Europeanization. Comparing Tables 2 and 3 we see that the level of
horizontal European communication is much lower than the level of
vertical European communication for monetary politics and agriculture.
In the other issue fields, vertical and horizontal Europeanization are
more or less on the same  low  level. Interestingly enough, media
claims (26 %) are over twice more likely to refer to other European coun-
tries than claims by non-media actors (11 %) are. Among the non-media
actors, civil society actors (6 %) display lower levels of horizontally Euro-
peanized claim-making than state and party actors (13 %); this indicates
a reverse pattern from what we found for vertical aspects of European-
ization. The stronger degree of Europeanization of media claims now
holds for six out of the seven issue fields. The only exception is agricul-
ture, where we find similar levels of horizontal Europeanization in the
claims of media and non-media actors (22 % for non-media and 20 % for
media claimants). The difference between media and non-media claim-
ants is most pronounced in claims on European integration  59 % of
the media claims refer to other European countries against 44 % of the
non-media claims  and in monetary politics  references to other
European countries can be found in 20 % of the media claims against
9 % of the non-media claims. Again, we have to make an exception for
the Bild Zeitung; this newspaper refers half as much (12 %), in reference
to the average of all newspapers (26 %), to other European countries.
Nevertheless, even the level of Europeanization found in the Bild-Zei-
tung is comparable to the levels found for non-media actors.
The results, thus again, strongly disprove the perspectives that attri-
bute the blame for a lack of Europeanization of public communication
to a lack of attention of the media for Europe and to the media’s alleged
tendency to frame issues in purely national terms. The results so far
indicate that the news media are more likely than other political actors
to pay attention to European integration and to emphasize vertical and
especially horizontal, transnational European aspects of issues. Not even
the claims made in the editorials and journalist statements in the populist
press are less Europeanized than the claims of non-media actors; al-
though they are as expected more nationally focused than those of the
other newspapers. The civil society actors are the only category that
could be singled out based on the fact that their contributions to public
communication on issues of European relevance lag behind institutional
developments. This raises the question whether Europe’s democratic and
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communication deficits perhaps do not so much concern a reluctance of
the media to present issues from a European perspective, but the lack of
a Europeanized civil society (see Koopmans, forthcoming).
The evaluation of European integration and European institutions
Even though the previous section showed that the mass media pay con-
siderably more attention to European (dimensions of) issues than other
actors do, this still leaves open the possibility that such attention for
Europe is primarily negative. This, too, is a frequent assumption about
the role of the media in the European integration process. In this view,
if the media pay attention to Europe at all, they are said to tend to
depict European policies and actors as conflicting with national interests,
as inefficient, bureaucratic, and undemocratic, while national actors and
policies are said to receive (at least in a relative sense) a more positive
treatment. Table 4 tests the validity of this thesis. The first column shows
the average position taken in relation to the European integration pro-
cess by different actors. Position scores range from a score of 1.00
indicating a negative position with regard to European integration to
1.00 for a positive stance12. To interpret the data correctly, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that what we measure here is an actor’s general attitude
towards the integration process. A positive attitude with regard to EU inte-
gration may well be combined with negative evaluations of particular EU
actors or institutions, which is depicted in the second column.
Table 4 again shatters some common prejudices about the role of the
media in discussions on European integration. Taking together all news-
papers, we find that they on average take a more pro-European integra-
tion position ( .38) than non-media actors ( .25) do. Equally surpris-
ingly, this holds also for the tabloid and regional papers (both .38). The
result for the tabloid Bild Zeitung is perhaps the most remarkable and
unexpected. We would, therefore, like to provide some qualitative exam-
ples drawn from the field of monetary politics to show what kind of
claims are behind this result. Initially, Bild had been highly skeptical
about giving up the Deutschmark. However, by the time of the actual
introduction of the Euro coins and bills in January 2002, it had come to
fully embrace the novelty. On January 2, 2002 Bild featured an editorial
saying “The Euro is there and the Germans should form a friendship
with their new currency. The new currency has something ‘eurotical’”.
Two months later, the paper defended the new currency against allega-
tions that it had led to inflation: “Even if the German public thinks that
with the Euro everything gets more expensive, this is wrong: Controllers
have proven that the Euro is as stable as the old DM was” (Bild Zeitung,
9 March 2002). A month later, Bild no longer denied that prices had
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Table 4. Average position of German actors regarding European Integration and Euro-
pean institutions and actors 20002002 (Means).
General position General position
regarding European regarding European
integration institutions and actors
Green Party .44  .11
Süddeutsche Zeitung .44  .11
FDP (Liberal Democrats) .43  .14
Bild-Zeitung .38  .38
Leipziger Volkszeitung .38  .18
SPD (Social Democrats) .38  .15
All media actors .38  .19
Federal government .37  .14
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung .35  .24
CDU (Christian Democrats) .31  .48
All state and party actors .30  .20
Bundesbank (Federal Bank) .26 .50
All non-media actors .25  .19
Experts and professionals .20  .13
Bundestag (Federal Parliament) .17  .21
All civil society actors .14  .17
Employers .14  .03
Regional and local governments .05  .61
CSU (Bavarian Christian Democrats) .02  .47
Farmers .00  .70
Labour unions  .14  .80
Overall average .31  .19
N 1,358 674
Note. The scale ranges from 1 very positive to 1 very negative.
Position scores are listed only for actors or actor categories for which we had five or
more cases on which to base on average score.
increased, but blamed shopkeepers, and neither the Euro nor the EU:
“There has been a price increase because of the Euro, provoked by shops
which have rounded up their prices. But it’s not a general inflation” (Bild
Zeitung, 20 April 2002). By June of the same year, Bild claimed to have
always had the opinion that prices had risen and had embraced the slo-
gan of the Euro as a ‘Teuro’ (‘teuer’ being the German word for expen-
sive). But even then, Bild did not blame the currency itself or the EU,
but ‘unfair prices’: “Because of many hidden price rises, the Euro is
becoming a Teuro. It was the BILD-campaign against unfair prices that
animated politicians to react” (Bild Zeitung, 1 June 2002). In other
words, even in the middle of its populist campaign against price hikes,
the Bild Zeitung did not choose to use the popular discontent about the
‘Teuro’ to launch an assault against the currency itself, let alone to de-
mand a reintroduction of the Deutschmark.
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A further remarkable finding is that the positions of the four newspa-
pers are very close, especially compared to the much broader range of
variation among non-media actors. For instance, while the positions of
political parties range from the euroskeptical CSU ( .02) to the Euro-
phile Greens ( .44), the four newspapers are all situated at the Euro-
phile end of the spectrum (from  .44 for the left-liberal SZ to  .31 for
the conservative FAZ). In the German context, then, media communica-
tion on Europe seems a centripetal and pro-European, rather than a
centrifugal force.
Some remarkable findings can also be found for non-media actors:
Among the political parties, the Greens ( .44), the centrist liberal and
pro-business FDP ( .43), and the social democratic SPD ( .38) are
clearly in the pro-European camp, while the Christian Democrat CDU
( .31) takes a position at the centre of the ideological spectrum in Ger-
many on the issue of European integration (see the  .31 overall average
at the bottom of the table). The Bavarian CSU is the only (moderately)
euroskeptical force ( .02) in the German party spectrum (at least among
the parties represented in the national parliament)13. Not surprisingly,
the national government, composed in the period under study of the
SPD and the Greens, takes a position close to these parties ( .37). More
remarkably, regional and local governments tend to be much less in fa-
vor of further European integration than the federal government ( .05),
a result which contradicts the assumption of an alliance between Europe
and the regions united in common opposition against the nation-state
that is popular in the academic literature14.
The results also provide additional evidence that the legitimacy prob-
lems that Europe faces are associated with its relation with the rest of
civil society rather than with the news media. All civil society actors
show below average levels of support for the integration process, and
express much less support for European integration than the media, the
national government, and most political parties do. European integra-
tion thus emerges as a project that is strongly supported by national
political elites and by the media, but which is seen in a skeptical light by
most civil society actors, and especially by those who have more to lose
than to gain from exposure to the European market15.
As we have already indicated, support for the European integration
process does not imply an uncritical attitude towards the way in which
European institutions function at present. The second column in Table
4 shows that such a discrepancy between general support for European
integration and specific support for European institutions and actors is
indeed widespread. While on average the European integration process
is moderately positively evaluated (on average  .31), European actors
and institutions are evaluated negatively (on average  .19). However,
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Table 5.* Frames used in relation to European integration and European institutions,
by claimant category, 20002002 (percent).
State and Civil society Media All German
party actors actors actors
Principles, norms, values 29.5 12.0 26.5 25.2
Community of values 5.1 1.3 6.5 5.3
Modernisation 1.9  2.3 1.8
Racism/xenophobia/nazism  2.7 1.5 1.2
Social justice and equality 1.9 1.3 2.3 2.0
International understanding 1.3  1.5 1.2
Peace 5.1 1.3 1.9 2.8
Unity 3.2 1.3 1.5 2.0
Other 11.0 3.8 9.0 8.9
Constitutional and institutional 26.9 10.7 23.1 23.1
principles
Democracy 5.8 1.3 13.1 8.9
Equality among member states 5.1 1.3 5.4 4.7
Subsidiarity, federalism, central- 8.3 2.7 1.5 3.9
ization, separation of power
Human rights 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4
Rule of law 2.6 1.3 0.8 1.4
Other 3.8 2.7 0.8 2.8
Good governance 11.5 9.3 13.1 11.3
Acceptance/legitimacy/credibility 5.1 2.7 4.2 4.5
in the eyes of the citizenry
Transparency  4.0 2.3 1.8
Efficiency 4.5 1.3 2.3 2.8
Bureaucracy 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Other 0.6  3.1 1.0
All identity frames 67.9 32.0 62.7 59.8
General instrumental frames 1.2 5.4 2.0 2.3
National interest 0.6 2.7 1.2 1.2
Freedom for citizens to work and 0.6 2.7 0.8 1.0
live elsewhere in the EU
Political (dis)advantages 8.9 5.3 6.2 6.9
Relations with USA 1.9 1.3 2.7 2.2
Security 3.8 2.7  1.6
Influence in international relations 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4
Other 1.9  2.0 1.7
Economic (dis)advantages 21.8 57.3 29.2 31.2
Economic stability 4.5 9.3 12.3 9.3
Inflation and prices 3.8 14.7 5.8 6.5
Economic growth 3.2 12.0 2.7 4.3
Strength in global competition 2.6 6.7 1.2 2.4
National economy and exports 1.3 5.3 1.5 2.0
Consumer protection 1.9  1.9 1.6
Other 4.5 9.3 4.8 5.1
All instrumental frames 32.1 68.0 37.3 40.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 156 75 260 493
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this does not lead to the conclusion that a particularly high level of
opposition to European institutions exists in Germany. These negative
evaluations are not a specific characteristic of the public debate on Euro-
pean integration, but a general feature of German public debate in the
media. If we compare the evaluations of EU institutions and actors to
those of German national institutions and actors, we find that the nega-
tivism towards EU institutions and actors is much lower. The evaluation
of German actors averages  .41 (not displayed in the table), whereas
the evaluation of EU institutions and actors averages  .19. For state
and party actors, the average evaluations are  .34 (EU  .20) for na-
tional actors,  .48 (EU  .17) for civil society actors, and  .45 (EU
 .19) for media actors. Thus, all three actor categories view European
actors and institutions less critically than national actors and institu-
tions  once more a finding that contradicts the pessimistic tone that
predominates in the literature on political communication in relation to
European integration.
Framing Europe
In the final step of our analysis we compared the interpretations that are
advanced to frame European integration, that is, the arguments that are
used to back the position an actor takes on the political project of
Europe. Here, the media are often held responsible for stimulating an
instrumental and materialist view of European integration, and for de-
emphasizing the idealist dimension of Europe as a community of ideas,
norms, and values. We investigate the empirical merits of this view by
dividing the legitimizations that claimants give for their position on
Europe’s role in two broad categories. The first category, ‘identity
frames’, refers to the normative issue of what Europe is or should be,
and what it stands for or should stand for. The second type, ‘instrumen-
tal frames’ refers to the issue of Europe’s functionality (or non-function-
ality) for other desired goods such as security or price stability. We fur-
ther distinguish three subtypes of identity frames, referring respectively
to principles, norms, and values (e. g., Europe as a promoter of interna-
tional understanding or as an anti-racist community), constitutional and
*Note to Table 5. Although we additionally coded secondary and tertiary frames when
present, the table lists only the primary frame of each claim. Separately listed are only
those frames that have at least five mentions for all actors taken together. Note also
that a frame may be used both negatively and positively with regard to the EU. We
have also coded the direction in which a frame is linked to the EU. For the present
analysis we ignore these differences, also because with our present data limitations the
numbers of cases would quickly become too low for such more detailed analyses.
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institutional principles (e. g., democracy and human rights), and good
governance arguments (e. g., the need for transparency and legitimacy).
Instrumental frames are likewise divided in three subtypes, referring to
general advantages or disadvantages of European integration (e. g., ar-
guments of EU membership being in, or against the national interest),
political advantages and disadvantages (e. g., together Europe has more
influence in international politics), and economic advantages or disad-
vantages (e. g., economic growth).
The largest difference in Table 5 is between civil society actors on the
one hand, and state and party as well as media actors, on the other.
Civil society actors  which in this study are predominantly socio-eco-
nomic groups and organizations  strongly emphasize the instrumental
side of European integration (68 % of all frames by civil society actors),
particularly socio-economic advantages and disadvantages (57 %).
Strength in global economic competition, economic stability, and eco-
nomic growth were most often mentioned as advantages of European
integration. Inflation and high prices, as well as adverse effects on the
national economy (particularly linked to the introduction of the Euro)
predominated among the disadvantages that were mentioned by civil
society actors.
By contrast, both state and party, and media actors emphasize imma-
terial aspects of the European integration process. There are a few differ-
ences of emphasis, however, between the framing of German media and
state and party actors. State and party actors are comparatively strongly
preoccupied with constitutional and institutional arguments related to
the future institutional structure of the EU, such as subsidiarity and
federalism (8 % of all state and party frames against only 2 % of media
frames), and they also more often bring up peace as a European value
(5 % among state and party frames, 2 % among media frames), and secu-
rity as an instrumental advantage of the EU (4 % of state and party
frames, none among media frames). The press, in contrast, mentions
democracy more often as a core value of the European Union (13 % of
media frames compared to 6 % of state and party frames). The overall
result, however, shows that the similarities between the framing used by
the media and by state and party actors, and the contrast between these
two categories and the civil society actors, are more striking than these
relatively minor differences. The pattern for media frames holds for all
four newspapers, although the regional LVZ mentions instrumental
frames somewhat more often than the two national quality papers do.
For the Bild Zeitung, we have too few cases (n  3) to make any mean-
ingful statement about frames. The Bild Zeitung not only has by far the
lowest number of editorials of our four newspapers; only 14 per cent of
the Bild editorials contain at least one frame, in comparison to 40 to 60
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percent in the other three newspapers. In other words, Bild editorials
usually present opinions without much argument.
Summarizing, one can say that the media side with the political elites
in terms of emphasizing constitutional principles and governance of the
European Union, and the collective identities, norms, and values that
Europe should stand for. In the end, there seems to be little truth in
the common assumption that the German media stir up anti-European
sentiments. Quite the contrary, the media converge with the political
elites in strongly emphasizing a normative and largely idealist attitude
towards the European integration process. The media criticism directed
at European and national politicians refers to holding them accountable
to these norms and values.
Conclusion
This study elaborates on existing research on the role of the media in the
Europeanization of public spheres. The empirical results challenge the
notion that the media are responsible for the resilience of largely nation-
ally focused public spheres. Quite the contrary is the case, if we are to
believe the findings on Germany for the years 20002002, which are
presented in this article. The German press pays more attention and, in
general, more favorable attention to the issue of European integration
than other actors do (especially civil society actors). This also goes for
European dimensions of other political issues. Moreover, much like the
political elites, the media strongly emphasize Europe as a political com-
munity that rests on common ideals, norms, and values. Unlike other
civil society organizations, they less often present instrumental and par-
ticularistic reasons for their support for, or opposition to, the European
integration process. This study, therefore, does not yield evidence for the
caricature of media as scapegoats for the lack of a European public
sphere. Instead, we find that if the media speak with their own voice,
they rather act as motors of Europeanization and so contribute to the
opening up of spaces for transnational communication. By contrast, na-
tional political elites, and more strongly even non-media civil society
actors are inclined to maintain the public debate within national bound-
aries.
Whether this is typical for the German media or represents a more
general trend in Europe remains to be investigated by way of cross-
national comparative analyses. At any rate, the results of this study show
that lacking public attention and support for European integration can-
not be attributed to general characteristics of the news media, such as
the lack of ‘news value’ of European policies and actors, the media’s
catering to national audiences or the presumed national perspective that
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dominates among journalists and editors. It could be that in some other
members states (e. g., the United Kingdom) the news media can be dis-
tinguished from other actors by paying less attention to European issues,
being more critical towards the EU, and framing integration in instru-
mental and particularistic terms. However, if this were the case we would
have to look for a context-sensitive explanation rather than general, de-
contextualized assumptions about how ‘the media’ work, which have
thus far predominated in the debate on the Europeanization of public
spheres. We think our analysis provides strong evidence against the com-
mon idea that the professional logic and news-gathering routines of the
modern mass media stand in the way of the emergence of a European-
ized public sphere. Our results also provide strong indications that the
lack of public attention and legitimacy for the EU may have other
reasons than merely the nature of media coverage. The category of ac-
tors that is systematically least likely to address European issues, which
is most likely to be critical of the integration process and of European
institutions when it does address such issues, and which most strongly
views the EU from an instrumental rather than from a normative point
of view, are non-media civil society actors. If this reading of the findings
is correct, Europe’s problem is not inattentive or unfriendly media, but
its distant and tenuous relations with its citizens and with their organized
representatives.
It should be repeated that the findings draw on one national case for
a limited period of time; they need to be completed by further investiga-
tions into the nature of public discourse within and across the European
Union. Three trajectories seem valuable to pursue in future research.
First, it is necessary to broaden the scope for comparative analyses of
the role of the media in national public spheres to test the hypotheses
regarding the context sensitive role of the media and other actors in
various European member states (e. g., Pfetsch, 2005).
Second, an encompassing picture about transnational public com-
munication in and about Europe would require including more national
media than newspapers. Regarding the political functions of public com-
munication, we see a division of labor between the various types and
formats of mass media. If we look for political discourse and the ex-
change for arguments in political debate, we need to focus especially on
the quality press, which in most countries plays a significant role as
media opinion leader for political agenda building. When the claims
analysis method was applied to television newscasts in Germany
(Schlecht, 2002), it was found that news stories contain much less sub-
stantial arguing than press articles and editorials do. Thus, it was con-
cluded that television is a secondary medium if we are to understand the
transnational dimensions of political discourse across Europe. However,
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if one is to identify the daily, event-driven hoops of European politics
which eventually may result in some sort of ‘banal Europeanism’ on the
citizen’s level, television news analysis should be the preferred choice.
Yet another medium that merits investigation is the Internet, which can
provide new opportunities for Europeanized political communication to
circumvent the selection gates of the traditional media (see Koopmans
and Zimmermann, 2003).
Third and finally, since the emergence of European public spheres
relates to a long term social and political process, which gains its deeper
meaning with respect to the political future of the EU, it would be highly
important to add a diachronic perspective to the observation of transna-
tional aspects of public communication. The current analysis only covers
three recent years, but we hope it will serve as a point of reference and
comparison for future longitudinal analyses of the role of the media in
Europeanized political communication.
Notes
1. The project is coordinated by Ruud Koopmans, Free University Amsterdam. Pro-
ject partners are Paul Statham, University of Leeds; Donatella della Porta, Euro-
pean University Institute; Hanspeter Kriesi, University of Zurich; Jos de Beus,
Universiteit Amsterdam; Juan Diez Medrano, University of Barcelona, Virginie
Giraudon, CRAPS Lille and Barbara Pfetsch, University of Hohenheim; for infor-
mation see http://europub.wz-berlin.de.
2. If supranational media are to be detected, they are confined to a limited audience
of political and business elites, who communicate in English, or are non-political
media specialized in sports and music (Kevin, 2003: 3841).
3. The studies discussed here draw on rather simple measures, such as the percentage
of European issues and actors in news coverage (e. g., Peter and de Vreese, 2003;
Kevin, 2003). Often also, conclusions are drawn from secondary analyses of data
that were gathered for other purposes (e. g., Gerhards, 2000; Eilders and Voltmer,
2004).
4. The Danish level of television coverage of EU affairs amounts to nineteen percent
of all news stories in routine periods, and twenty-five percent in summit periods.
5. This argument is corroborated by the findings of Peter and de Vreese (2003), who
show that more spectacular European events such as summit meetings do receive
slightly higher levels of coverage, and that public mobilizations or referendums
about European issues create a significant visibility of EU politics. This visibility,
however, helps national actors to gain prominence on European issues.
6. It has further been argued that national media organizations devote rather limited
resources to their news infrastructure in Brussels, and information flows in
Brussels and the networks of EU-correspondents tend to be organized along na-
tional lines. However, Meyer (1999) shows that the resources of media in Brussels
have considerably increased, and that transnational networks of journalists have
emerged.
7. See Koopmans and Statham (1999) for a further discussion of this methodology.
8. Contrary to these small qualitative differences, there were large differences in the
quantity of coverage. The two quality papers reported many more relevant claims
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than the regional paper, which in turn was more inclusive than the very sparse
coverage of the tabloid.
9. The coding manuals for the coding of claims in news coverage and in editorials
are available online at http://europub.wz-berlin.de. These manuals contain full
details on the sampling, the identification rules for claims, and the coding of
individual variables.
10. To give the reader an idea of how this coding works, consider the following
example of a claim in the field of troop deployment: “Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer criticized Britain and Spain’s support for the USA’s military campaign
against Iraq, saying that this had undermined the search for a common European
position on the issue”. The claimant is Fischer, whose scope is coded as national,
Germany; Britain and Spain are the addressees (with negative evaluation), the
USA and Iraq are the object actors. Although these are all national actors, the
issue is framed by Fischer in a European context. Thus, the issue scope in this
case would be ‘European’.
11. This is linked to a predominance of socio-economic actors among the civil society
actors in our data: unions, employers, professional groups, and economists and
financial experts together make up about sixty percent of the civil society actors.
12. These scores were calculated as averages across all claims made by a particular
actor or category of actors. An individual claim was given a score of 1 if it
was in favor of extending the competencies or resources of the EU in a certain
issue field (or against reductions in these competencies), a score of1 if it argued
for a reduction in EU competencies or resources (or against an extension), and
a score of 0 if it was neutral or ambivalent regarding extending or reducing EU
competencies or resources (e. g., when a claim argued for a shift of competencies
from one EU institution to another).
13. The only party represented in the national parliament that is not included in the
table is the post-communist PDS. It has a centrist position score ( .33); we did
not include this score in the table as it is only based on three cases.
14. Closer inspection of the data shows that the low score for regional and local
governments is not caused by the party composition of governments at this level,
because regional SPD-led governments also tended to be more critical toward
the European integration process than the national government.
15. See Koopmans (forthcoming) for evidence that confirms these results for all
seven countries of our study.
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